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Abstract
Research …nds that …rms’ investment decisions are distorted by irreversibility and …nance
constraints. Whereas the existing literature examines the e¤ects of these features separately,
this paper studies their interaction. The impact of these constraints on a …rm’s incentive to
invest is characterised using option pricing techniques. Financial constraints reduce the initial
capacity, raise the marginal value product of capital and the value of the option to invest.
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1 Introduction.
The consensus view is that the frictionless neoclassical model of investment behaviour is ‡awed.
Recent research focuses on two themes, technological and …nancial constraints, to explain observed
investment behaviour, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Hubbard (1998) for surveys. However,
while much progress has been made, virtually all the existing literature considers the impact of
one such constraint in isolation.1 This is problematic because each constraint is used to explain
similar features of investment activity,2 yet the causes of each and hence policy recommendations
to which each leads are substantially di¤erent. In this paper I take a step towards integrating these
two features of investment behaviour. I introduce a …nancial constraint into a model of irreversible
investment under uncertainty and characterise the impact on the …rm’s investment policy using
both a q-type approach and an option pricing framework. This does not permit analysis of how
the constraints themselves might interact, but does allow us to consider how the presence of both
constraints a¤ects the incentive to invest.3
The basic insight of the option pricing approach is that, when investment is (completely)
irreversible, involves sunk costs and may be postponed until some uncertainty has been resolved,
the standard net present value rule becomes invalid. The …rm must take account of the fact
that by undertaking investment, it exercises an option, since this option is valuable, it must be
incorporated into capital budgeting calculations. Increases in the level of uncertainty raise the
value of this option to invest, and so reduce the incentive to invest. This literature has developed
to allow for features such as alternative market structures etc. see inter alia Dixit and Pindyck
1 Two recent empirical studies formally control for the interaction of the two constraints: Scarramozzino (1997)
shows, for a panel of UK …rms, that q-theory holds only for the subset of …rms for which both irreversibility
and …nancial constraints are unlikely to be present. Guiso and Parigi (1999), using cross-section data on Italian
manufacturing …rms, …nd that the impact of uncertainty on investment, is consistent with irreversibility, controlling
for the existence of …nancial constraints.
2 Irreversibility and …nancial constraints may each account for several empirical regularities: the history dependence
of investment decisions; the existence of hurdle rates for investment and periods of inactivity (threshold e¤ects and
nonlinearities); the dominance of quantity variables over price variables in investment equations; the volatility of
aggregate investment (both why it is so high and why it is lower than that predicted by a frictionless model).
3 In the real options approach, with its focus on the dynamic resolution of uncertainty, constraints are imposed
exogenously. Even though informational asymmetry, in the form of a lemons problem in secondary markets, is
a frequently cited potential source of irreversibility, Dixit and Pindyck (1994), it is standard practice to take the
irreversibility as given and concentrate on its consequences rather than model the role of informational asymmetries
explicitly. Financial constraints are also seen as arising from informational asymmetries, Hubbard (1998), but as the
focus here is on the consequences of the resolution of uncertainty, it is more convenient to avoid explicit treatment
of the informational asymmetries, take the constraint as given.INVESTMENT, IRREVERSIBILITY, AND FINANCIAL IMPERFECTIONS
(1994). Many of the results in this literature have been established in the context of continuous
time models, however the key insights can be conveyed and generalised more conveniently in a
much simpler setting. For instance Abel et al. (1996) use a two period model to demonstrate the
relation between option pricing and q theoretic approaches, in a paper which extends the canonical
model to allow for costly expandability as well as incomplete reversibility. Below I adopt a two-
period framework as a convenient means of extending the canonical irreversible investment model
to allow for …nancial constraints.
One paper related to these issues is by Vercammen (2000). He considers the impact of a
particular form of …nancial constraint, the threat of bankruptcy, on an irreversible investment
decision. He assumes that investment must be …nanced by debt, and that the lender may foreclose
if the value of debt is greater than the value of the …rm’s assets. He shows that, if the contribution
to the probability of bankruptcy arising from additional investment is increasing in the level of
debt held, the …rm will prefer to delay investment when the (initial) probability of bankruptcy
is high. This behaviour has a natural option value interpretation. Whereas Vercammen (2000)
considers the decision to invest in a discrete project, this paper focusses on the more realistic
and elaborate problem of optimal capacity choice. Vercammen deliberately removes the standard
features of the option pricing model so as to establish the separate option value arising from the
probability of bankruptcy. Yet this makes direct comparison of the results di¢cult. The integrated
treatment of the two features of investment behaviour provided below allows optimal investment
policy to be characterised analytically and, importantly, focuses facilitates direct comparison with
canonical model of irreversible investment.
A simple two-period model of …rm investment behaviour is outlined in the next section and the
impact of introducing …nancial constraints into irreversible decisions is analysed using q¡theoretic
and option pricing frameworks. The next Section considers the impact on the option value multiple.
The impact of changes in the distribution of returns on the incentive to invest is discussed in the
penultimate Section. The …nal Section contains a conclusion and suggestions for future research.INVESTMENT, IRREVERSIBILITY, AND FINANCIAL IMPERFECTIONS
2 Optimal Capacity Choice.
This section illustrates the distinct roles played by irreversibility and …nancial constraints in a
dynamic model of investment under uncertainty. I use a simple two period framework that in-
corporates only the necessary features: second period returns are stochastic and investment is
irreversible but may be postponed, the …rm’s decisions may be a¤ected by the availability of
funds. Behaviour is characterised …rst in terms of a q¡type measure, and then using option
pricing techniques.
2.1 The Model
Suppose that a …rm exists for two periods. It inherits cash (wealth) with value ¹ X in period 1, but
is unable to raise external …nance in period 1. This may be due to the presence of informational
asymmetries between the …rm and potential lenders4 , but for current purposes, rather than model
the origins of the …nancial constraint, it is more convenient to take the existence of this constraint
as given and discuss its consequences. In period 1 the …rm installs capital K1 irreversibly, at unit
cost P, subject to the constraint X ¸ P K1, and receives total return r(K1), where r0 (K1) > 0;
r00 (K1) < 0. In period 2 the …rm’s return to capital is given by R(K;e), where e is stochastic,
and represents the level of demand (and other factors a¤ecting the pro…tability of the …rm). It is
assumed that all uncertainty is captured in e. Thus once e is known all uncertainty is resolved.
For simplicity it is assumed that any informational asymmetry is also resolved by period 2 so that
…nancial constraints only bind in period 1.5 It is assumed that the period 2 marginal revenue
product of capital, RK (K;e) ¸ 0, continuous and strictly decreasing in K and continuous strictly
increasing in e. Finally assume that the price of capital equipment remains constant through
time.6
Given these assumptions, optimal investment policy in the second period is characterised by a
threshold value of e = ¹ e, such that
RK (K1; ¹ e) = P; (1)
4 For instance, Hellwig and Stiglitz (2000) demonstrate conditions under which a …rm may be jointly equity and
credit constrained.
5 It would be perfectly possible to extend the …nancial constraint to the second period, for example by imposing
the additional constraint P (K2 ¡ K1) ￿ °¡1¡
¹ X ¡ PK1 + r (K1)
¢
. It isn’t clear that this adds insight.
6 Allowing for imperfect expandability, time varying P, while not di¢cult, would add little to the main results.INVESTMENT, IRREVERSIBILITY, AND FINANCIAL IMPERFECTIONS
where 8 e > ¹ e, investment occurs at unit cost P, until a new optimal capacity level K2 (e) is
attained, such that RK (K2 (e);e) = P, and 8 e ￿ ¹ e no investment occurs: K2 (e) = K1:
The value of the …rm, V (K1), with capacity K1 in period 1 is the net present value of expected
revenues as given by equation (2)
V (K1) = r(K1) + °
Z ¹ e
¡1
R(K1;e)dF (e) + °
Z 1
¹ e
fR(K2 (e);e) ¡ P [K2 (e) ¡ K1]gdF (e); (2)
where ° is a discount factor. The …rm’s period 1 problem is to maximise this value through
(irreversible) choice of the initial capacity, subject to the …nance constraint
max
K1
V (K1) ¡ P K1 subject to ¹ X ¡ P K1 ¸ 0: (3)
There are two cases, depending on whether or not the …nance constraint binds.
Case 1. ¹ X > P K1: This is the standard irreversible investment problem, where the …nancial
constraint does not bind and is a special case of the model analysed by Abel et al. (1996). The
optimal capital stock in period 1 under the pure irreversibility constraint alone, denote this as KI
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dF (e) ¡ °P [1 ¡ F (¹ eI)] = P (4)
where ¹ eI is the threshold value of e at which investment occurs under the pure irreversibility
constraint. This provides a baseline against which the combination of irreversibility and …nancial
constraints can be compared.
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¡ ¹ X ¡ P K1
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where ¸ is the multiplier associated with the inequality constraint ¹ X ¸ P K1. Denote the optimal
period 1 capital stock when the …nance constraint binds as KFI


















dF (e) ¡ °P [1 ¡ F (¹ eFI)] = P + ¸: (5)
Where ¹ eFI is the threshold value of e at which period 2 investment occurs, when period 1 activity
has been …nancially constrained.INVESTMENT, IRREVERSIBILITY, AND FINANCIAL IMPERFECTIONS
2.2 An Interpretation









and other terms. Since the impact of the …nancial constraint is over and above that of
the irreversibility constraint KFI
1 < KI

















= P, j 2 fI;FIg, and as
RK (K;e) is continuous and increasing in e it follows that ¹ eFI < ¹ eI. Using this information and
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The di¤erence in the marginal value product of capital in case 1 and case 2 arises from di¤erences
in the marginal revenues over the lifetime of the …rm. The marginal revenue product of capital is
greater in each period when the …rm is …nancially constrained.
To see this note that since KFI
1 < KI








> 0. The di¤erence
between the expected period 2 marginal revenue product of capital in the two cases consists of
three elements, depending on whether the realisation e would trigger investment in both cases,
neither case or only one case. Since ¹ eFI < ¹ eI then for e < ¹ eFI the …rm would choose not to
invest irrespective of the presence or absence of …nancial constraints. Moreover since RK (K;e) is














dF (e) > 0. For e > ¹ eI the …rm would invest
choosing K2 (e) such that RK (K2 (e);e) = P, regardless of whether or not it had perviously
been …nancially constrained. Therefore the di¤erence in the expected marginal revenue product of
capital is zero for e > ¹ eI. Finally when e 2 [¹ eFI; ¹ eI), if the …rm had been …nancially constrained
it sets K2 (e) such that RK (K2 (e);e) = P; but otherwise leaves capital stock unchanged at KI
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= P; it follows that the di¤erence in the case 2










also positive. As the sum of three non-negative terms, the overall di¤erence between the expected
period 2 marginal revenue product of capital in the …nancially constrained and uncontstrained
cases is positive.7
3 A Real Option Perspective
A di¤erent perspective on the impact of …nancial constraints can be obtained using the real option
approach. The value of the …rm can be decomposed into two components: i) the present value of
pro…ts accruing from current capital stock, ii) the present value of pro…ts accruing from the option
to invest once uncertainty has been resolved.
De…ne the value of the …rm with capital stock K
j
1, j 2 fI;FIg, assuming that no further
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The incentive to invest (irreversibly) in period one is higher when the …rm also faces …nancial
constraints because of two e¤ects. First, …nancial constraints increase in the marginal value
product of capital installed, assuming that no future alterations in capital stock are undertaken.
























dF (e), and arises
because KFI < KI when the …nancial constraint binds. Second, imposition of the additional
burden of a …nancial constraint raises the value of the marginal call option to invest, which reduces
the incentive to invest by increasing the payo¤ to delaying investment until the uncertainty and
…nancial constraints are resolved. To see this note that, since KFI < KI, so for all e > ¹ eI at
which the …rm facing just irreversibility constraints has the incentive to invest in period 2, it has














dF (e) > 0. Also, for values of e 2 [¹ eFI; ¹ eI), the previously
…nancially constrained …rm has an incentive to invest which is not present if it had not earlier











dF (e) > 0.
The option pricing approach reveals that, the …nancial constraint, when binding, reduces the
period 1 capital stock, this raises the incentive to invest by raising the marginal productivity of
capital installed, although this e¤ect partially o¤set by a rise in the marginal value of the call
option to wait and invest in period 2.
3.1 The Option Value Multiple
A standard metric used to illustrate the impact of irreversibility on optimal investment decisions,
under uncertainty, is the option value multiple. This hurdle rate feature determines the extent to
which the marginal value product of capital installed (permanently) in period 1 must rise above
the purchase price of new equipment. Under the additional burden of …nancial constraints, theINVESTMENT, IRREVERSIBILITY, AND FINANCIAL IMPERFECTIONS
marginal (call) option to invest in period 2 rises, that is the marginal value of waiting increases,
therefore to justify investment, the marginal value of (period 1) installed capital must be higher
than P by an even greater mutiple than under pure irreversibility constraints. The algebra is






















































Under the additional burden of …nancial constraints, the option value multiple exceeds that under
pure irreversibility precisely because the restriction on period 1 investment means that the marginal
value of capital currently (and permanently) installed is higher.
4 Changes in The Distribution of Returns
One particular area of interest is the impact of changes in the distribution of e on the incentive to
invest. First consider a rise in the mean value of e (a …rst order increase in the distribution of e).
Write V 0 (K1) as
V 0 (K1) = r0 (K1) + °
Z ¹ e
¡1




An increase in the mean value of e produces the standard ”bad news” e¤ect, Bernanke (1983):
unless the shift of the distribution is entirely con…ned to the ranges [¹ e;1), the incentive to invest
will increase. The impact of the extra burden of …nancial constraints is straightforward: since
¹ eFI < ¹ eI, good news is a more likely phenomenon when uncertainty is resolved, but good news,
doesn’t a¤ect the incentive to invest. In other words, there is an interval (¹ eFI; ¹ eI) of the support of
F (e) such that if the …rst order change in the distribution of e is entirely due to re-arrangement of
probability mass within that interval, a …rm facing only irreversibility constraints would have an
increased incentive to invest, whereas a …rm under irreversibility and …nancial constraints would
face no such incentive.
Finally consider a second order change in the distribution of e, a mean-preserving spread, which
8 This is the ”value of assets in place ” version of q, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), p. 147.INVESTMENT, IRREVERSIBILITY, AND FINANCIAL IMPERFECTIONS
provides insight into the role of uncertainty in determining the level of investment. In general this
change will have an ambiguous e¤ect under irreversibility. The marginal value of capital already
installed may rise or fall depending on whether RK (K1;e) is a convex or concave function of
e. The marginal value of capital installed rises if this function is convex in e and declines if
it is concave. The option to invest will rise in value under such a shift, leaving the net e¤ect
ambiguous. Provided the point of crossing between the old and new distributions lies below ¹ e, the
value of the marginal call option increases. Since this decreases the incentive to invest in period 1
decreases. When the …rm faces …nancial constraints these same e¤ects are at work, and it remains
indeterminate whether or not investment will rise.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a simple analytical characterisation of a …rm’s investment policy under irre-
versibility and …nancial constraints in terms of real options, and illusatrates the linkage to standard
q¡theoretic treatments. Financial constraints accentuate irreversibility constraints, with the re-
sult that the …rm is more wary of undertaking investment. The additional …nancial constraint
leads the …rm to adopt a higher option value multiple (hurdle rate) in investment decisions than a
pure irreversibility constraint alone. Prior to the resolution of uncertainty, this reduces the capital
stock that a …rm is willing to hold, so that the marginal value product of capital is higher for such
a …rm. This was explained i) directly in terms of di¤erences in the expected marginal revenue
product of capital throughout the …rm’s life and also in terms of the option to invest. In the
latter case, the presence of an additional …nance constraint raises the value of the option to delay
investment until uncertainty is resolved, although this e¤ect is outweighed by the increase in the
marginal value of capital currently installed (since the capacity is lower when the two constraints
occur simultaneously).
Here the two constraints are imposed exogenously, and one could consider them as arising
independently. However, it is clear that the constraints may well act to complement each other.
Financial constraints can exacerbate the irreversibility constraint by making the …rm more wary
of undertaking investment, while irreversibility could exacerbate any tendency for …rms to faceINVESTMENT, IRREVERSIBILITY, AND FINANCIAL IMPERFECTIONS
…nancial constraints, since one would imagine that lenders would be less willing to lend to those
…rms who wished to undertake irreversible investments. This suggests that it would be fruitful
to consider the impact of irreversibility of investment in a model of informational asymmetries
in …nance in order to allow the interaction of irreversibility and …nancial constraints to enter the
analysis.INVESTMENT, IRREVERSIBILITY, AND FINANCIAL IMPERFECTIONS
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